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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). Subsequently, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2-4 and 
Rule 42a of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court 
transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this matter include: 
I. Whether the trial court erred in applying Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. to sanction 
Plaintiff John F. Fay, where he based his Complaint's allegations on a 
reasonable enquiry. Fay preserved the issues in the trial court by means 
of his memoranda and arguments in opposition to defendants' Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions, his memoranda and arguments in opposition to 
Global Travel's Motion for Attorney Fees, and in his memoranda and 
arguments in support of his Motion to Amend and For New Trial. See, R. 
414,472,494. The standard of review for evaluating the denial or 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: (1) the 
findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) 
legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; 
and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, J 10,973 
R2d 422; Barnard v. Sutiff, 846 R2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992). 
Whether the trial court erred in failing to support its conclusions of law 
on Rule 11 sanctions with specific findings of fact as required by the rule. 
The standard of review for evaluating the denial or imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: "(1) the findings of fact are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are 
reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and 
amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, J 10,973 P.2d 422; 
Barnard v. Sutiff, 846 P.2d 1229,1234 (Utah 1992). 
Whether, even if a sanction was warranted, the trial court erred in 
awarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by Defendant Rogers 
without considering an offset for the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 
vi 
The trial court erred in not making any real findings on this issue, nor 
even addressing the Plaintiff's mitigation of damage claim. R. 479-480, 
488-489,516 This is a question of fact-finding. The standard for review 
of the factual errors is from a clearly erroneous standard, that the 
contested ruling is so lacking in support as to be against clear weight of 
the evidence. Rule 52a of U. R. Civ. P., Young v. Young, 979 P2d. 338 
(Utah 1999); Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P2d. 932,937 (Utah, 1998). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes and rules applicable herein are Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j), 
78-2-2-4, and Rule 11, Rule 12, and Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case and Course of Proceedings 
1. Plaintiff John Fay filed a civil lawsuit in the Third District Court alleging 
causes of action in bad faith breach of contract and fraud, arising out of a 
fraudulent telephone solicitation and a subsequent, breached, settlement 
agreement. Record, 1-12. 
2. Defendants Global Travel Network and Todd Rogers filed an Answer, which 
included affirmative defenses of "waiver", "estoppel", "accord and 
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satisfaction", "tendered payment", and "failure of plaintiff to mitigate his 
damages [emphasis added]", but no motion to dismiss any defendant, nor 
motion for a more definite statement, nor any such procedural motion that 
would call to the court's attention the belief of one party (Rogers) that he was 
not a proper defendant in the action, R. at 13-17. 
3. Fay duly conducted discovery into his claims. During the course of discovery, 
the trial court found defendants in default, dismissed defendants, and 
sanctioned defendants twice and ordered them to pay Fay's attorney's fees, for 
deleterious conduct in refusing to respond to discovery, R. at 120-21,277-78. 
4. Defendants conducted NO discovery into issues relevant to potential defenses, 
counterclaims, or oppositions to Fay's claims. See Record. 
5. Approximately one month before the originally scheduled trial date, Rogers 
first raised his claim that he was not a proper party defendant, and he 
petitioned the court to be dismissed from the case, R. at 308-310. 
6. For unrelated reasons the trial date was continued, and reset to a date 
approximately one month after the original trial date. R. 401 
7. The trial court granted Rogers' motion to dismiss approximately one month 
before the rescheduled trial date, R. at 377,401. 
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8. The trial court, at defendant's urging, ordered plaintiff to 'elect a remedy' at 
trial, so trial proceeded on fraud claims against Global. The court found in 
favor of Global. R. 452. 
9. Rogers made a motion for sanctions under U. R. Civ. P. rule 11. R. 404. 
10. Global made a motion for attorney fees under statutory and contractual 
theories, R. at 458-462. 
11. Fay opposed both motions, with affidavits. R. at 426-428,472-481. 
12. The trial court granted Rogers' Motion for Sanctions and denied Global's 
Motion for Attorney Fees. R. at 514-517. 
13. Fay made a motion for new trial and motion to amend, R. at 493-511. 
14. Defendants did not file any opposition to Fay's post-trial motions. See Record. 
15. The trial court summarily denied Fay's post-trial motions, and entered 
Judgment on October 7,2008. R. at 535. 
16. Fay filed his Notice of Appeal November 5,2008. R. at 537-538. 
B. Statement of Facts and Disposition 
1. This matter arose out of telemarketing calls in November 2005, in which an 
offer of a free trip from representatives of Defendant Global Travel was twice 
recorded on Fay's home telephone answering machine, R. at 1-12. 
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2. Fay contacted the number provided to claim his promised trip, and was 
informed there would be no free trip, despite the promises, R. at 1-12. 
3. Fay complained to the Utah Attorney General. The Consumer Fraud Division 
investigated, and found Global Travel Network guilty of fraud, R. at 1-12. 
4. Through Fay's contact with Utah A.G. office, it presented Todd Rogers as the 
figurehead and sole authority for resolution of claims against Global. R. 1-12. 
5. Rogers made contact with Fay by telephone and written correspondence to 
discuss settlement of Fay's claims against Global Travel. R. 449 
6. Throughout those discussions Rogers presented himself as Global Travel. Id. 
7. Fay and Rogers arrived at an executory Settlement Agreement, which Rogers 
signed "for Global Travel". R. 40,449-451. 
8. Following a long delay in signing the agreement as requested, Rogers, 
through his attorney, David Maddox, submitted the agreement, with the date 
of his signature backdated, as evidenced by the date arid textual references of 
the accompanying fax sheet from Maddox. R. at 373,397-99,430-33. 
9. Fay attempted to rely on the agreement, conducting his duties under it, but 
defendants failed and refused to tender payment when due under the 
agreement. R. 1-17 
x 
10. Fay filed a civil suit in Third District Court based on the breach of the 
agreement, the fraud in entering the agreement, including the fraud in back-
dating the signature on the Settlement Agreement, and the fraud in the original 
telephone solicitation. R. l,et. seq. 
11. Global, through counsel, tendered payment three weeks after suit. R. 13. 
12. Rogers' response to the suit was to join in an Answer filed by counsel. R. 13. 
13. Fay presented evidence at trial that Rogers backdated his signature on contract 
provision, acting in his personal capacity on behalf of company. R. 449. 
14. Fay showed evidence that Rogers held himself out as the company, took 
responsibility for fraudulent acts of company agents, and promised to pay Fay 
for the company's wrongdoing. R. 494,472 
15. Fay presented evidence that counsel for Rogers, David Maddox, told Fay in 
writing that Rogers was Global Travel. Rogers made the same written 
representations. R. 499,509-511. 
16. Fay presented evidence that Utah State Attorney General's office, consumer 
fraud division settled code violation action with Rogers acting for Global. R. 
449-451. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant John Fay appeals to this Court for review of a Judgment of the Third 
District Court, J. Faust, dated October 7,2008, and the related Minute Entry Order 
of April 15,2008, from which the Judgment arose. (See Addendum). Fay submits 
that the Judgment must fail, as it is reliant on the M.E. of April 15,2008, in which 
the trial court improperly uses Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P. to sanction Fay, fails to 
adequately find specific facts and state reasons for legal conclusions, and fails to 
address the issue plaintiff raised on the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Fay 
submits that the 4/15 M.E. is unwarranted on the facts herein, and the Judgment 
that flowed from it is void. Fay respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
Judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for findings consistent herewith. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court erred in applying Rule 11 to sanction John Fay. The clear 
mandate of Rule 11 requires that a trial court follow strict procedures to find 
violation of the rule only in specified limited circumstances. The trial court 
here did not follow those procedural guidelines, as set forth in the rule and in 
case law interpreting and applying the rule, and applied the rule over-broadly 
to sanction John Fay on the facts of this matter. 
II. The trial court erred in failing to support its conclusions of law on Rule 11 
sanctions with specific findings of fact. In failing to properly account for the 
bases of it's conclusions of law in the Minute Entry-Order, the court below 
failed again to follow the mandates of the rule, and cases interpreting the rule. 
III. The trial court erred in accepting the amount of Todd Rogers' alleged attorney 
fees in this case as the amount of the "sanction" under Rule 11, in that 
awarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by Defendant Rogers without 
offsetting for his failure to mitigate damages following from the litigation, and 
without finding facts or stating conclusions in support of it's refusal to address 
the issue, is clear error, and requires reversal of the excessive sanction herein. 
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I. ARGUMENT 
A. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING RULE 11 TO SANCTION 
FAY WHERE HE BASED ALLEGATIONS ON A REASONABLE ENQUIRY 
The trial court entered an Order in this matter, referring to Rule 11, U.R.Civ.R, as 
authority to sanction Plaintiff John F. Fay for his decision to include Todd Rogers 
as a defendant in the lawsuit that gives rise to this appeal. Not only did the trial 
court not follow the specific mandates of the rule itself, in reaching to apply the 
sanctions allowed by the rule to Fay in this matter, but the court also erred in 
erroneously interpreting and applying the standards of application of the rule set 
out in decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in a case concerning erroneously ordered sanctions, 
held, that to avoid sanctions does not require perfect research but rather research 
that is "objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. .. .(citation omitted). 
In other words, [Plaintiff] Barnard need not have reached the correct conclusion; 
he need only have made a reasonable inquiry". Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P. 
2d 917,920 (Utah 1993). Continuing, the Barnard court found no sanction 




On the legal standard governing the consideration of Rule 11 sanctions, a panel of 
this court stated that: 
This rule, requires some inquiry into both the facts and the law 
before the paper is filed; the level cf inquiry is tested against a 
standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. 
Taylor v. Taylor, 770 R2d 163, at 171 (Ut. App. 1989) 
In reviewing Fay's pre-Complaint conduct, the relevant question: was his inquiry 
into the facts "reasonable under the circumstances"? is answered affirmatively. 
The related question: were his allegations and conclusions at least "tenable" or 
"plausible"? is also answered in the affirmative. His pre-litigation inquiry led him 
to these facts: 
1- Following Fay's report of fraudulent telemarketing activity, the Utah 
Attorney General investigated Defendant Global for fraudulent telemarketing and 
fined it. Upon Fay's inquiry that office told him he could deal with Rogers "as 
Global" as it had so dealt with Rogers in its investigation. Rogers admitted to the 
AG that Global violated the law in its misrepresentations to Fay. Lastly, the AG's 
office also told Fay that Rogers signed the AG's office's monetary fine and 
punishment findings against Global. 
2- Rogers contacted Fay and represented that he, Rogers was the person who 
was responding to Fay for his telemarketing complaints against Global, Rogers 
said he would make the "misrepresentations good." 
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3- Subsequently, Rogers always spoke for Global and entered into a settlement 
agreement for Global. During these negotiations, Rogers never said he was not 
Global. 
4- At the time of the settlement agreement, Rogers back-dated his signature by 
17 days, where the date of his signature was an operative provision of the contract. 
5- During the settlement negotiations and pre-litigation, Rogers wrote Fay a 
letter wherein he referred to Global as "my company. " 
6- At or about this same time, Rogers' counsel wrote to Fay, also indicating that 
Global was Rogers 'company and that he (Rogers) would satisfy the claim. 
See Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion, at 1 to 6, and Fay's Affidavit, 
Record at 426-428, the two letters referenced, Record at 499, 509-511. 
It is apparent from facts on the record that Fay made a reasonable inquiry, and that 
he relied on plausible representations from various sources to the very same point, 
that Rogers was Global or, at least, the controlling force behind "Global Travel". 
Were Fay's beliefs reasonable under the circumstances? Yes, given that the 
representations came from 1- the Attorney Generals' Office which was then 
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investigating Global, and 2- oral representations from Rogers, fo llowed by, 3-
Rogers' conduct in speaking and negotiating for Global with the Attorney 
General's Office, and in 4- Rogers' conduct in speaking and negotiating for Global 
with Fay, and in 5- Roger's written representation directly to Fay that Global was 
"his company" followed by, 6- Rogers' counsel's written representation to Fay that 
Global was Rogers'company Points 1-6 Record at 426-428, 499, 509-511. 
Rule 11 requires that: "allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary 
support " Sfifi Rule 11(b)(3). Here, the sources Fay relied upon in assessing 
whether to sue Rogers were persuasive on the subject, capable of offering 
competent evidence if called upon to do so, and further, the three sources related 
the very same information, to the effect that Rogers was Global. Finally, and 
equally important in this consideration, is the fact that the sources were 
independent of Fay and had no self-interest in the assertions. Clearly, Fay's 
allegations and other factual contentions had evidentiary support and, certainly, 
reliance on the sources met the standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances. Thus, by plain language of Rule 11, sanctions were not warranted. 
Cross referencing these facts and the circumstances surrounding the inquiry with 
case law interpretation of Rule 11, supra, shows that the law properly rejects any 
sanction on the facts here. But the trial court misinterpreted Rule 11. 
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The trial court misapplied the criteria for assessing the reasonableness of Plaintiff's 
inquiry. In Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 R2d 917 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court found where an allegation or contention is "tenable" or "plausible," 
it does not deserve sanctions. Fay relied upon the Attorney General's office, the 
potential defendant, Rogers, and his counsel, which inquiry and resulting reliance 
led to allegations in the Complaint that were both "tenable" and "plausible." 
In his Motion for Sanctions, Rogers argues that Plaintiff had no facts, nor reason to 
sue him, and bases his arguments on seven assertions - but, critically, all seven 
assertions were discovered after Fay filed his Complaint. See Defendant's 
Statement of Facts Record at 407-408. Fay noted this attempt by Rogers to build 
an argument for sanctions on hindsight arguments, in his Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion. Record at 419-420. How can Fay be sanctioned for having 
no grounds for filing his Complaint against Rogers, based upon arguments that are 
supported only by facts discovered after filing the Complaint? 
Here, given the consistency of information that Fay's enquiry produced, from 
various, reliable sources, including representations by Rogers and his counsel, mat 
reflected Rogers to be Global, the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. 
Under the circumstances, Fay's pre-litigation inquiry was objectively reasonable, 
and no sanctions are warranted. Fay, therefore, respectfully requests that this 
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Court, on review, find the Order below in error, and reverse and remand the matter 
to the trial court for correction. 
B. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPORT ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON RULE 11 SANCTIONS WITH 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AS REQUIRED BY THE RULE 
The Order entered by the trial court (Addenda), is fatally defective in being 
conclusory, where the law mandates specific detail. Appellant here evaluates fatal 
deficiencies and erroneous material conclusions in the trial court's Order, seriatim: 
1. ''''The court finds that Mr. Rogers is an employee of Defendant Global Travel 
Network". This fact was certainly not apparent to Fay, pre-litigation, but was 
discovered long after the Complaint was filed, so cannot be the basis for a sanction 
as to Fay's conduct, or knowledge, at the time he filed the complaint. 
2. "He [Rogers] was involved in resolving the Plaintiffs complaints concerning 
Global Travel Network and signed a Settlement Agreement with Plaintiff on behalf 
of Global Travel Network". The court, here ignores, however, the uncontested fact 
that Rogers back-dated his signature on the settlement agreement, as shown by text 
of the documents accompanying delivery of the signed settlement agreement to 
Fay, sent by counsel David Maddox. See R. 373,430-433,397-399. 
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3. However, the Court finds that there is absolutely no evidentiary support for the 
Plaintiff's claims he understood Mr. Rogers to be "Global for all intents and 
purposes." Indeed it is clear from Plaintiff's opposition and his affidavit that he 
understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. Rogers was merely representing 
Global Travel Network". Yet, this finding and conclusion is in direct contradiction 
to the points in Plaintiffs affidavits. Record at 426-428, 506-508. Fay's affidavit 
representations are "tenable" and "plausible". 
The first error is the Court's failure to understand that, even if, assuming arguendo, 
Fay knew, at the time, that Rogers was merely "representing" Global, this does not 
mean or infer that Rogers was simply an employee. In reality, an owner of a 
company, an officer or director of a company, could likewise be "representing" the 
company and yet still be the "company". Someone, some individual, has to 
represent a company, but to represent a company does not compel an 
understanding, or impart a belief to others, that the "representative" is only an 
employee especially in the face of that individual's representations to the effect that 
he is the company. 
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Despite the court's contention, it is not clear that Plaintiff understood throughout 
these proceedings that Mr. Rogers was merely representing Global Travel 
Network. Plaintiff's affidavit contradicts the court's conclusion in that it attests to: 
a. The Utah Attorney's General's Office told Fay to deal with Rogers. It 
did not say Rogers was "only an employee". It only directed Fay to Rogers 
in his dealings with Global. 
b. Rogers contacted Fay and represented that he would "make the 
[telemarketers'] representations good." 
c. Rogers always represented to Plaintiff that he was "Global." 
d. Rogers back-dated the settlement agreement. 
e. Rogers and his counsel made written representations that Global was 
((Rogers'company." Record at 509-511. 
Finally, in this regard, it is crucial to recall that in the Complaint Plaintiff alleged 
that he u believes Defendant Rogers is a principal of Defendant Global." 
Complaint, Record at 2. 
4. "In addition, while Plaintiff alleged breach of contract and fraud claims against 
Mr. Rogers, the Court can find no evidence to justify the assertion of these claims. 
As indicated above, Mr. Rogers was not a party to the contract at issue in this case. 
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In addition, the plaintiff never alleged that Mr. Rogers was the alter ego of Global 
Travel Network or otherwise directly benefited from the telemarketer ys alleged 
misrepresentations. Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated a link between 
Mr. Rogers and the fraud he alleged in the Complaint or even a reasonable belief 
that such a link existed. To the contrary, the Plaintiff clearly had no factual support 
for his claims against Mr. Rogers, but nonetheless asserted these claims in the 
apparent hope of discovering some down the road". Here the court is only 
addressing the telemarketing contact. It simply ignores Rogers' deceit in back-
dating the settlement contract where the date of his signature was a material 
provision of the contract. The court was aware of this deceit. Record at 397-399, 
417, 430-433. 
Rogers' counsel has agreed that a corporate "officer or director is liable for his own 
false representations", citing Armed Forces Ins. v. Harrison, 2003 UT14, 70 P. 3d 
35, and again, citing Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Ut. App. 1998) for the 
principle that a director is personally liable if he "acts in bad faith or commits a tort 
in connection with the performance of his corporate contracts." Record at 410 - 11. 
Instantly, when Rogers misrepresented Global as "his company" and when he 
back-dated the settlement agreement, he acted in bad faith and committed torts. 
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The trial court misinterprets Rule 11 when it imposes sanction on a finding that 
Fay asserted claims against Rogers in the apparent "hope" of discovering some 
"factual support down the road". But, Rule 11 (b) (3) provides for allegations and 
factual contentions that are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery. Sanctions cannot properly be 
premised upon a type of allegation that is specifically permitted by Rule 11. 
5. "Overall, it is important to point out that the Court is not dealing with a simple 
case of factual errors or misstatements, which are clarified upon reflection or 
through the discovery process. Rather, this is a case where the Plaintiff had 
absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Mr Rogers in this action and 
asserting claims against him ". Here, the trial court concludes that this is not a 
simple case of factual errors and misstatements. But the court does not say why 
this is not a case of simple factual errors or misstatements. We are left to guess. 
The trial court goes on to state it's unsupported conclusion that Fay had absolutely 
no legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rogers. This is manifest error because 
the court had before it Fay's affidavit setting forth several objectively reasonable 
grounds why he had reason to sue Rogers. But the court failed to identify why 
these grounds were insufficient and why the court maintained the position that Fay 
"had absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rogers." How and why 
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devoid of supportive facts or legal reasoning behind the court's leap to resolution. 
A panel of this court held, that: uto warrant rule 11 sanctions, factual errors or 
mmiatemea '. 'must he significant [ci t ing] Mm >i \ I'.n in .'niMll hi S'6
 ( (\S' i1 5 
R3d 1021 (quoting 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d Sec. 1335 (1990)) ", K.EK. V.T.W.& B.L. W., 2005 UT 
App 85 [4], 110 P.3d 162. But in the matter now before this Court, the trial court's 
Order failed 
The law demands more than presumptions proffered as facts and legal conclusions 
completely void of legal reasoning demonstrating why the sanctioning court 
infillM ed nil tilt," t i f f 111 i ill in 
We have said that a trial court is required to make explicit findings 
of fact in support of its legal conclusions. See Willey v. Willey, 951 
R2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997)* This is particularly necessary in the Rule 11 area. 
The law requires that a trial court make a series of specific factual findings 
as a predicate for concluding that the rule has been violated, The trial 
court's findings and conclusions must reveal the court's reasoning clearly 
enough that an appellate court can apply the appropriate standard of review 
to each part of the trial court's ruling, Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78 f 101, 
985R2d255. 
The trial court's Order herein has no explicit findings of fact in support of its legal 
conclusions. It's only two "factual findings" are in the first two sentences; both are 
11 
undisputed, and together, are much less then the series of specific factual findings 
required./*?/* concluding that the rule has been violated. Further, the Order reveals 
nothing of the court's reasoning. An appellant, or reviewing court, must guess at 
how the trial court reached its conclusions. But, Rule 11 demands that: 
When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the 
basis for the sanctions imposed. Rule ll(c )(3) [emphasis added.] 
The trial court made two factual "conclusions", totally devoid of any detailed 
factual findings. The court then grafted on a host of legal conclusions. But the 
legal conclusions, in addition to being legal errors, are devoid of legal analysis. 
Had the court engaged in the required factual finding in support of legal analysis, 
all explained with specificity required by Rule 11 and case holdings interpreting 
the rule, it would have found sanctions are not appropriate in the matter before it. 
Thus, the findings and conclusions of the Order cannot support Rule 11 sanctions. 
Fay submits that this Court should properly reverse the Order of the lower court. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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C. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE AMOUNT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES CLAIMED BY ROGERS WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING AN OFFSET FOR THE DOCTRINE OF 
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES 
The trial court failed to consider an important legal principle, in awarding the 
amount of attorney's fees claimed by Rogers without considering a reduction for 
his initial failure to take simple measures to avoid most of the consequences of the 
lawsuit of which he complained. Variously called the "doctrine of avoidable 
consequences" or "mitigation of damages", the precept has a simple purpose: "to 
prevent one against whom a wrong has been committed from recovering any item 
of damage arising from the wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or 
minimized by reasonable means. [Citation omitted]" John Call Engineering, Inc. 
v. Manti City Corp., 795 R2d 678 (UTApp. 1990). 
Thus, where Rogers could have, by a simple action, such as a motion to dismiss, 
under U.R.Civ.P. Rule 12 (b) (6), or a motion for more definite statement, under 
Rule 12 (e), achieved the desired result, of limiting his involvement in the legal 
action, it was his affirmative duty to take such action to avoid further harm, and if 
13 
he did not, he cannot complain of the cost to him. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that: 
under the doctrine of avoidable consequences the nonbreaching party has an 
active duty to mitigate his damages, and he "may not, either by action or 
inaction, aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach." Utah Farm Prod. 
Credit Ass'n v. Cox, 627 R2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981); Angelos v. First 
Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); see also Anesthesiologists 
Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030, 1039 (Utah App. 1993); John 
Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981). 
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104 [31], 990 P.2d 933. 
Further, a panel of this Court, held: 
In order to satisfy the duty to mitigate damages, a non-breaching party must 
make "reasonable efforts and expenditures." Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., 
743 P.2d 1212,1214 (Utah 1987) (quotations and citations omitted); 
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380 [29], 80 P.3d 553. 
While many of the cases discuss the issue in terms of contractual relations, and 
often refer to the "plaintiff's" duty to mitigate damages flowing from a breach, the 
logic of the doctrine of avoidable consequences has applied to both plaintiffs and 
defendants in property settlements, in marital or business dissolutions, and in other 
factual scenarios, and the reasoning is directly applicable to the instant 
circumstance of an award of a financial sanction, where the amount of the 
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monetary sanction awarded by the trial court is exactly equal to the amount of 
attorney fees claimed by the party who alleges damages caused by a legal action. 
Rogers could have defended the action, at a significant financial savings, by means 
of a simple legal motion at an early stage. The burden is on him, and his counsel, 
to do so, and by so doing, limit, or mitigate, his damages and avoid the avoidable 
consequences of plaintiff's act. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, "[o]ne need never take steps 
in advance to avoid the consequences of a future threatened wrong 
rather, need only avoid or minimize damages that - : < -,K • 
has already been committed, t", Mrt^rm^-k Hi, ' Accord 
tivstatement (Set YWJ) of Torts § 9}H( I) (1979) (barring recovery of damages 
that one could have avoided by reasonable efforts "after" the commission of 
the tort). Angelas v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 R2d 772 (UT 1983). 
Under these authorities, the "sanction" that the trial arranted 
herein. The court merely adopted, as the monetp 
attorney fees claimed by Rogers, withoti( i utisiikitiif1 ,m ullscl m nnlm hm \m iln 
doctrine of avoidable consequences, IIMI did the mini <IIM uss n s leasoningfor 
failing to accept Fay * reqm>( i< > i .ider • I• iw ISMI*' .""' V'.1 ' I T1' 1-80,488-9, 
514-16,454-456. 
It is undisputed that Rogers could simply have filed a motion to explore the option 
of terminating his involvement in the lawsuit at a very early stage, and with 
minimal expense. Rogers must bear responsibility for failure to take simple, 
reasonable measures to mitigate any potential damage following from the wrong he 
claims. Fay bears no responsibility for the extent of any such additional exposure 
to damage that Rogers allowed himself to accept by failure to file an appropriate 
motion at the earliest opportunity. 
Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the Order of the trial court, below, 
in light of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, and remand the matter, for 
further consideration of an offset against any sanction award to account for the 
mitigation Rogers may have made of the damages he alleges. 
D. Exception to Usual Duty To Marshall Evidence 
Generally, a party who challenges a fact finding has a duty to marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding, and then proceed to show why the 
evidence, considered in it's entirety, is insufficient to support the judgment. See 
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Rule 24(a)(9), I l<. \pp.l' I his duty has been described as requiring that 
"appellate counsel must play the ticvil \ advocate in gathering the evidence in 
support of the proposition that the party opposes. See, Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida 
Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 R2d 1051 (Ut. App. 1994). 
But, a critical exception to this usual heavy duty upon the party challenging factual 
findings of the trial court, is where the trial court's findings are so inadequate that a 
meaningful understanding by the appellate court is impossible. In such a case, 
appellant need only show the court's findings as legally insufficient: "appellants 
need not engage in a futile marshalling exercise if they can demonstrate the 
findings, as framed by the court, are legally insufficient. [Citations omitted]." 
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Ut. App. 1995). 
Such is the case here. The trial court's findings are so incomplete, so conclusory, 
so lacking in requisite detail, that any effort to marshall the evidence in support of 
such limited findings would be futile. Hence, Fay submits that he has met his 
burden in challenging the trial court's incomplete findings of facts. 
17 
CQNCUJSWN 
Plaintiff and Appellant John F. Fay respectfully requests that this Court review the 
Order of the Third District Court, the Honorable Robert Faust, dated October 7, 
2008. Plaintiff submits that this Judgment and Order is defective in that it fails to 
follow the express mandate of Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., and the controlling authorities 
interpreting the rule, where Fay conducted a reasonable inquiry upon which he 
based his tenable conclusions and allegations in the Complaint. Further, Fay 
submits that the Judgment and Order fails to follow the specific requirement of the 
rule and controlling authority by not containing a detailed findings of facts upon 
which the court may base conclusions of law. Finally, the Court neglected to take 
into account, nor explain the absence of reasoning based upon Fay's submitted 
arguments relating to avoidable consequences that Rogers may have taken to 
minimize his exposure to damages, if any. Therefore, Fay respectfully requests 
that this court reverse this Order and, in the alternative, to remand to the trial court 
to reconsider the amount, if any, and propriety of sanctions under Rule 11. Finally, 
in the event this Court finds, and orders, that the trial court erred as urged by Fay, 
that Rogers and his counsel are and should be jointly and severally liable to Fay for 
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his awls MM;1, iilli n u»'v Irrs associated with prosecuting this appeal, and in 
defen»ling against 11•< Motion for Sanctions in the trial court. 
SUBMITTI I > llns __.....I... day of April 2009. 
Jamej/L. Mouritsen 
Attorney for J ^ " F Fay 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I attest that on this \ day of A p » 2009,1 caused to be delivered, by U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF addressed to: 
David Maddox 
1108 W. South Jordan Pkwy, # A 
South Jordan, UT 84095 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
III AMI'" F""\tK' HALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
\\)\\\l 1 " > ' a.. ^dividual, : MINUTE ENTRY • 
Plaintiff, : C?^R M<», ' > . • 1 
vs. : 
GLOBAL TRAVEL NETWORK, TODD :' 
RODGERS, and DOES 1 -10 , Indusive,. _' 
Defendants 
The Coin I 1MM hf-'for^  i I net tuiuiiiit IUUU Rodgers' Motion for Sanctions. 
under Rule '13 , Having reviewed the moving and .responding Mnmorrmda'' 
.com - . determines that the Plaintiff violated 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of civil Procedure in brining «; 1,-1 11h n^ uiii^ t 
Defendant Todd Rodgers and that sanctions in the form of attorney's fees 
and costs are warranted. 
The Coin! ! iijij', lint. Mr. Rodgers is an employee of Defendant Global 
Travel Network. He was involved in resolving the Plai nl i ft"' i\ complaints 
n neer. niin-i .lolni! Ti\iv(. I Network and signed a Settlement' Agreement with 
the- Plaintiff on behalf of Global Travel Nefu " H' wew] , Lhr »:ourt 
.- a;,,.... ^ tely nc evidentiary support for the Plaintiff's 
claim-, that ~e understood Hx. ken io • i i tn- '^l^hal im ail intents and 
£ A* V. GLOBAL 
TRAVEL NETWORK PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
PUrposes." Indeed, it is clear from the Plaintiff's opposition and his 
f£i davit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr. 
0c%ers was merely representing Global Travel Network% 
In addition, while the Plaintiff alleged breach of contract and 
r
^Ud claims against Mr. Rodgers, the Court can find no evidence to 
justify the assertion of these claims. As indicated above, Mr. Rodgers 
a s
 not a party to the contract at issue in this case. In addition, the 
laintiff has never alleged that Mr. Rodgers was the alter ego of Global 
^avel Network or otherwise directly benefitted from bhe telemarketer's 
alleged misrepresentations. Simply put, the Plaintiff has never 
^monstrated a link between Mr Rodgers and t-h** fraud he alleged in the 
°
mPlaint or even a reasonable belief that such a link existed. To the 
c
°ntrary, the Plaintiff clearly had no factual support for his claims 
a9^inst [Mr. Rodgers, but nonetheless asserted these claims in the 
aPparent hope of discovering something down the road.^  
Overall, it is important to point out that the Court is not dealing 
Wlt::h a simple case of factual errors or misstatements, which are 
arified upon reflection or through the discovery process. Rather, this 
l s a
 case where the Plaintiff had absolutely no legaL or factual basis 
°
r
 involving Mr. Rodgers in this action and asserting claims against 
FAY V. GLOBAL 
TRAVEL NETWORK
 P A G E 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
him. Under these unique circumstance's, th<\- ~-rurt concludes that the 
Plaintiff directly violated Rule i± £.. r . ws are warranted. 
I n reachinq Mu>, {conclusions,, the Court: .notes: that>:jt-he. Pla it iff ,1s. 
himself an attorney and initial] v represented h „f,r'-further,/while, 
he subsequently engaged counsel, :• ' appearr. o the Court uhau he 
continued to direct this action in most ^y r- , Consequently, the 
Court declines to ru^ -,,-,-, 1 :ie Plaintiff's counsel also violated Rule 
•^r 'to hold counsel jointly' liablr 1 ' r.vf* ndarit Rodgers for his 
attorney's *<•-•• mul v»;Af; rtie Court instead holds the Plaintiff liar:":-
under Rule ; tor such fees and costs. 
Thin '• ,"^4'- decision •>• i~A stand as the 'Order of the Cour t, 
granting " Rodger's Motion ft - *• • , s 
Dated Mi is \ _. /.. :ay of April, .?008. ; 
y 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
DISTRICT COURT " •* 
pan DISTRICT c o m 
Third Judicial District 
David R. Maddox #2044 8GI" - ? 2008 
Attorney for Defendant Todd Rogers $> q SALT LAKE COUKTY 
1108 West South Jordan Parkway, Suite A % " South Jordan, Utah 84095 _ „ v <*Hitya«* 
Telephone: (801) 446-3788 ^ - u r r ^ ^ 
Facsimile:(801)365-7215 0 r o U % v f ^ V tf 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
JOHN FAY, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLOBAL TRAVEL NETWORK, TODD 




Civil No.: 060900141 
Judge: Robert Faust 
Was a Defendant Todd Rogers Motion for Summary Judgment came on befoffe the above 
entitled Court on the 24fb day of January, 2008. The Court granted defendant Rogers Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the two claims, against defendant Todd Rogers, Trial on this matter was 
set for April 2,2008. At that time, the Court awarded attorneys fees in an amount to be determined 
after filing an Affidavit of Attorneys Fees on behalf of counsel for defendant Todd Rogers. Having 
received said affidavit and memorandum from all parties relating to attorneys fees, the court ruled 
on August 21,2008 that as result of legal services rendered by attorney David Maddox, plaintiff 
Todd Rogers is entitled to the judgment in the some of $6,301.10. 
JD27181181 pages: 2 
060900141 FAY.JOHNF 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant Todd Rogers 
recover Judgment against plaintiff in the principal amount of $$6,301.10 The Judgment shall bear 
interest at the Judgment rate of 6.99% until paid. 
DATED this MMay of September, 2008. 
BY THE COURT 
Judge Robert Faust, District Court Judge. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
and correct copy of the foregoing has been served th is / ^day 
of August, 2008, by U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, upon the following: 
James L. Mourilsen 
Gregory & Swapp 
2976 W. Executive 1 1 u\\ it m 
Lehi, UT 84043 
(X ) U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile (801) *>« Ml V>tt\ 
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